The success of forest governance reforms aimed at decentralisation, local participation, and sustainable resource use depends on the bureaucracy implementing such reforms. One such case of decentralised forest governance is the Forest Rights Act (FRA) in India, which recognises the rights of traditional forest dwellers to forest resources that they historically used. Most studies on FRA implementation have only highlighted the obstructionist role played by state forest departments. However, the implementation of the FRA is the joint responsibility of the revenue, forest, and tribal welfare departments. This article examines the role and interplay of power among all three departments in determining implementation outcomes. Employing bureaucratic politics theory and an actor-centred power framework, the paper argues that unless power inequalities within a multi-department implementation setting are addressed, failure in implementing decentralised forest policies is a foregone conclusion. Addressing these power inequalities through collateral structural changes in the concerned departments and regular training can help in effective implementation.